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Abstract 
 
Folk wisdom and popular literature hold that, in the face of death, individuals tend to regret 
things in their lives that they have done or failed to do. Terror Management Theory (TMT), in 
contrast, allows for the prediction that individuals who are confronted with death try to minimize 
the experience of regret in order to retain a positive self-esteem. Three experiments put these 
competing perspectives to the test. Drawing on TMT, we hypothesized and found that 
participants primed with their own death regret fewer things than control-group participants. This 
pattern of results cannot be attributed to differing types of regrets (Study 1). Furthermore, we 
provide evidence suggesting that the effect is not purely a product of cognitive mechanisms such 
as differing levels of construal (Study 2), cognitive contrast, or deficits (Study 3). Rather, the 
reported results are best explained in terms of a motivational coping mechanism: When death is 
salient, individuals strive to bolster as well as protect their self-esteem and accordingly try to 
minimize the experience of regret. The results add to our conceptual understanding of regret and 




# words: 188 
 
Keywords: terror management, mortality salience, regret, death, self-esteem 
  
 
MORTALITY SALIENCE AND REGRET       - 3 - 
An unscathed past in the face of death: Mortality salience reduces individuals’ regrets 
 “Non, je ne regrette rien” (“No, I don’t regret anything”) sang the French singer Édith 
Piaf–three years before her untimely death in 1963. In her famous song she emphasizes that she 
regrets neither the bad nor the good things in her life and will leave them all in the past. The 
song’s lyrics are also in line with the well-known proverb that “life is too short for regrets.” 
However, many people will possibly think it is difficult to follow this common saying. One might 
assume that one’s regrets will appear even more profound and numerous when one is reminded of 
the undeniable fact that time on Earth is limited. After all, people are left with too little time to 
fulfill all their wishes and to make up for all the mistakes they have made in trying to. The 
internet and the popular literature market are full of advice, telling people which places to see, 
which books to read, and which activities to do before they die (e.g., “1,000 Places to See Before 
You Die”, Schultz, 2012), or cautioning against what might happen if humans live their lives in 
the “wrong way” (e.g., “The Top Five Regrets of the Dying: A Life Transformed by the Dearly 
Departing“, Ware, 2011). These writings share the underlying assumption that an individual will 
most certainly experience regret as soon as realization sinks in that his or her life is limited, 
because the individual has made uncorrectable mistakes or missed out on things he or she should 
have done.  
Contrary to the popular belief that humans might experience stronger regrets when 
thinking about their death and in line with Édith Piaf’s message, we argue that the common 
saying “life is too short for regrets” might be easier to follow than people think, particularly 
because it reminds them of their death. Building on Terror Management Theory (e.g., Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) as well as on the Theory of Regret Regulation (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007), we propose that thoughts about one’s own death will not increase but instead 
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decrease the number of regrets individuals experience due to the need to maintain one’s self-
esteem after a death prime.  
Regret: A Threat to Self-Esteem 
Regret can be defined as “a comparison-based emotion of self-blame, experienced when 
people realize or imagine that their present situation would have been better, had they decided 
differently in the past” (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007, p. 4). It is thought to be an aversive, 
cognitive feeling which individuals are typically motivated to avoid (Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg 
& Pieters, 2007). Regret usually occurs when individuals realize that they have made a mistake or 
a suboptimal decision, especially if it is very easy to imagine a different outcome (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). It is a complex 
emotion which requires both the higher cognitive ability to imagine other possible outcomes as 
well as personal agency, meaning that the individual made a certain choice, which he or she 
could have done differently (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). 
Regret plays a major role in people’s lives; in fact, it is the most frequent out of nine 
negative emotions (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008).  There are many things humans may 
regret, such as decisions to act as well as decisions not to act (acts of commission and omission, 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994), a regrettable outcome of a decision as well as a regrettable decision 
process (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002), and even mere thoughts, events, or future decisions that 
have not yet occurred (Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg, 1999). Regret is often related to negative 
states such as anger, wistfulness, emotional distress, and despair (Gilovich, Medvec, & 
Kahneman, 1998; Landman, Vandewater, Stewart, & Malley, 1995), and typically represents 
failure experiences (Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002). It is therefore not surprising that regrets have 
also been found to pose a threat to people’s self-esteem. Josephs, Larrick, Steele, and Nisbett 
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(1992) showed that people with low self-esteem in particular protect themselves against the 
outcomes of risky decisions by trying to minimize the regret that they will experience. Therefore, 
individuals should be particularly motivated to protect themselves against regret when they need 
to maintain a high level of self-esteem–for instance, when they are confronted with their own 
death. 
Mortality Salience and the Self-Esteem Buffer 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) and the Mortality Salience (MS) hypothesis 
conceptualize how death awareness affects human behavior and cognitive processes (Burke, 
Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg et al., 1990; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The theory’s 
general assumption is that the human instinct for self-preservation and the knowledge that one is 
invariably going to die one day, create a great potential for anxiety (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). This potential for existential anxiety or “terror” becomes 
especially salient when an individual is made aware of his or her mortality, for instance, by 
confrontation with any stimulus that reminds the individual of death. Since death anxiety is 
considered to be a highly aversive state, humans will try to protect themselves against it by means 
of a dual process (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999): First, proximal defenses set in 
when individuals consciously think about death and entail the suppression of death-related 
thoughts as well as the denial of one’s vulnerability. Second, distal defenses set in a few minutes 
after a death prime. They are defined as unconscious defenses, which subsequently take place 
when thoughts of death are still active but not in focal attention anymore. Distal defenses are 
typically not directly related to death but serve the goal of reducing anxiety by enabling “the 
individual to construe himself or herself as a valuable participant in a meaningful universe” 
(Pyszczynski, et al., 1999, p. 853). For this purpose, individuals make use of certain buffering 
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mechanisms, which consist of (a) stronger belief in one’s cultural worldview and the set of 
standards and values associated with that worldview, and (b) the belief that one is meeting or 
exceeding those standards (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000; Harmon-
Jones, et al., 1997). Both mechanisms bolster self-esteem by assuring the individual that his or 
her existence in the universe has a certain meaning and by promising literal or symbolic 
immortality to the ones who believe in and comply with the standards of value in a specific 
culture (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).  
 Several studies demonstrate that after a death prime, individuals increase their efforts or 
report stronger intentions to endorse behaviors and opinions which are linked to personally or 
culturally important domains of self-esteem, such as social norms of tolerance (Greenberg, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), individualism/collectivism (Kashima, Halloran, 
Yuki, & Kashima, 2004), financial aspiration (Jonas, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2013; Kasser & 
Sheldon, 2000), charity and prosocial behavior (Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 
2008; Jonas et al., 2008; Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Jonas, et al., 2013), 
reciprocity (Schindler, Reinhard, & Stahlberg, 2013), and health-related behaviors (Arndt, 
Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004). On the same note, 
individuals tend to avoid behaviors and distance themselves from opinions that pose a threat to 
their self-esteem (Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000). The striving 
for positive self-esteem goes so far that even irrational and potentially harmful behavior, such as 
risky driving, smoking, or tanning, will be pursued if the behavior contributes to an individual’s 
positive self-esteem (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999; Cox et al., 2009; Hansen, Winzeler, 
& Topolinski, 2010; Routledge, et al., 2004). For instance, Hansen and colleagues (2010) showed 
that participants who derived self-esteem from smoking improved their attitudes towards 
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smoking after being exposed to death warnings on cigarette labels compared to control warnings. 
In line with theoretical assumptions about different proximal and distal defenses, this pattern only 
occurred after a delay, suggesting that individuals unconsciously defend themselves against threat 
by engaging in a re-interpretation of potentially threatening thoughts in a positive, self-affirming 
way. In this concrete example, they might for instance have thought about reasons why smoking 
benefitted them (e.g., smokers are more fun and social than non-smokers).  
Taken together, a broad array of studies indicate that individuals will be both motivated to 
maintain self-esteem as well as protect it from additional threat when mortality is salient. To do 
so, individuals typically engage or plan to engage in behaviors that promote self-esteem by 
emphasizing culturally or personally important values or norms.   
To the present date, previous research has mainly focused on behavior and decisions that 
are related to the future or the present, and therefore can easily be changed or adapted to suit the 
current goal to bolster self-esteem. Different from the present or future, the past cannot be 
changed. However, here we suggest that even negative decisions and past behavior may be used 
to bolster one’s self-esteem by finding some good in the bad. Specifically, we argue that the need 
to protect one’s self-esteem, which arises from MS, will influence how individuals interpret 
potentially regrettable issues. 
Mortality Salience Decreases Regrets 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) suggest that humans are motivated to regulate their regrets 
even in a normal state, because regrets are perceived as aversive. We assume that individuals for 
whom mortality was made salient will be particularly motivated not to feel regretful because they 
need to maintain and protect their self-esteem. While a successful pursuit of self-esteem results in 
positive emotions as well as a sense of control and safety, failed attempts to bolster one’s self-
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esteem typically result in individuals feeling even more worthless, anxious, and vulnerable to 
threat (Crocker & Park, 2004). Since the experience of regret poses a threat to one’s self-esteem, 
admitting one’s failures and wrong decisions after a death prime will therefore counteract the 
goal of pursuing self-esteem and may tear down individuals’ defenses against death anxiety. 
Accordingly, we propose that after a death prime, individuals will engage in what 
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) call “psychological repair work” (see also Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007) to maintain self-esteem and to avoid regret. Psychological repair work consists of several 
regulation mechanisms, which all serve the goal of interpreting potentially regrettable issues in a 
more favorable light and therefore correspond to the concept of a pro-active, distal defense. First, 
individuals can engage in bolstering their decision and downplaying the value of rejected 
alternatives, thereby trivializing the importance of potentially regrettable issues (Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Chen, 1995). For instance, imagine a man who is trying to cope with a painful 
romantic break-up and who tells himself that it’s not the end of the world and in a couple of 
weeks he will be over it.  Second, individuals can try to identify the silver linings of their 
decisions, for instance, by convincing themselves that they have learned a lot from their mistake, 
that there are some positive aspects about the issue, or that they were lucky since events could 
have easily turned out even worse (Teigen, 2005). For instance, the aforementioned man could 
conclude that as a result of the break-up, at least now he is free to go out with whomever and 
whenever he wants. Third, individuals can frame the entire potentially regrettable issue in a 
positive light, for instance, by telling themselves that the chosen option was actually the best, that 
the experience was worth the negative outcome, or that the negative result was inevitable anyway 
(Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005). For instance, the rejected partner may think that the relationship 
had no future anyway, and so it is better it ended earlier than later. These regret regulation 
MORTALITY SALIENCE AND REGRET       - 9 - 
mechanisms also converge with research on the meaning maintenance model, which states that 
when mortality is salient, individuals strive to maintain meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; 
Proulx & Heine, 2006). Interpreting potentially regrettable issues in the sense that all of one’s 
critical decisions were meaningful and for the best with regard to a bigger picture could therefore 
be a powerful source of meaning, which would then counteract the existential terror posed by 
MS. Note that these three regulation mechanisms are closely linked and the particular usefulness 
of a specific mechanism depends highly upon the specific issue at hand. Therefore, we will 
henceforth not distinguish between the three mechanisms but summarize them under 
“psychological repair work.”  
In sum, thinking about one’s own death creates a potential for existential anxiety, which 
individuals typically buffer against by bolstering their self-esteem. Because experiencing regret 
threatens positive self-esteem and therefore would counteract one’s defenses, we assume that 
individuals engage in psychological repair work when being asked about their regrets. This 
psychological repair work includes thinking about potentially regrettable issues and trivializing 
them, identifying silver linings as well as interpreting these issues in a positive light. Due to 
this repair work, we expect individuals to report fewer regrets when mortality has been made 
salient.  
To test our hypothesis, we conducted three experimental studies. In Study 1, we 
investigated whether MS causes people to select fewer regrets from a predefined list and 
controlled for differences in the type of regret. Study 2 employed an open assessment of regrets 
and tested whether varying temporal construal (by instructing participants to list either recent or 
lifetime regrets) would influence the results. In Study 3, we investigated whether the effect would 
indeed be best explained by a motivational rather than a cognitive interpretation. More 
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specifically, we tested whether a death prime would only decrease the number of reported regrets 
or whether the effect would extend to other types of memories such as satisfying life decisions or 
events. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested our assumption that an MS prime would decrease the number of regrets 
that individuals select from a predefined list. To achieve this aim, we asked participants to write 
either about death or a control topic (manipulation adopted from Jonas, et al., 2002) and then 
presented participants with a list of regrets. The participants’ task was to decide whether each 
regret applied to them or not.  
Method 
Materials and pretest. To create a comprehensive list of possible regrets, we 
systematically selected a total of 48 regrets we thought would be considered typical in the 
following areas of life: education, community/culture, family, friends, relationship, self, health, 
and leisure time (distinction based on Roese & Summerville, 2005). We pretested this list with 
the following goals in mind: First, we wanted to avoid regrets which either applied to everybody 
or to no one. Second, we wanted the final sample of regrets to consist of both omission and 
commission regrets (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003) as 
well as regretted issues that an individual had high versus medium control of. We did not want to 
include incidents in the final sample that participants had little or no control of, since according to 
the theory of regret regulation, personal agency is central to the concept of regret (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007).  Forty-two participants (36 % female, Mage = 34.43, SD = 13.33, Range: 19 - 67) 
judged the amount of control that people had over the different regrets on the list (7-point scale; 
little control – high control) as well as whether these regrets described acts of omission or 
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commission. Moreover, participants were asked to indicate whether they had ever experienced 
these particular regrets or not.  We selected the items which were most distinct in regard to 
control and the omission/commission distinction as well as varied in whether they applied to 
participants or not. By this procedure, the initial sample was reduced to 16 regrets: 4 
omission/high control, 4 omission/medium control, 4 commission/high control, and 4 
commission/medium control (see Appendix). High and medium control regrets differed 
significantly in their average ratings, t(41) = 12.18, p < .001, d = 1.88; (M = 6.25, SD = 0.88 vs. 
M = 4.90, SD = 0.90, respectively). The selected regrets applied to 14 – 69 % of all participants, 
with an average of 38 %.     
Participants and design. Data was collected using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Eighty-
five individuals participated in the study for financial compensation. Two participants were 
excluded from the analyses because they had already participated in the pretest. Of the remaining 
83 participants, 60 % were female and the average age was 36.30 years (SD = 14.06, Range: 18 - 
75). All participants were US citizens. They were randomly assigned to either the MS or the 
control condition.  
Procedure.  After participants were welcomed and consented to participation, for half of 
them mortality was made salient by a standard manipulation (e.g., Jonas, et al., 2002), which was 
successfully used to induce MS in numerous previous studies (for an overview, see Burke, et al., 
2010). Participants in the MS condition were asked to answer two questions related to death 
(“Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you;” ”Jot 
down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and 
once you are physically dead.”) Participants in the control condition answered the same questions 
with regard to dental pain. Next, participants were given the expanded Positive and Negative 
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Affect Schedule (PANAS-X,  Watson & Clark, 1992) as a filler task. This was done because 
previous research has shown that the distal defenses against MS, such as psychological repair 
work of one’s potentially regrettable issues, set in after a delay of a few minutes (Greenberg, et 
al., 2000). Subsequently, participants were presented with the 16 regrets and had to decide 
whether each regret applied to them or not. After that, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
provided with a code for payment. 
Results  
To test the hypothesis that participants would select fewer regrets in the MS compared to 
the control condition, a sum score was calculated over all regrets that participants reported as 
applicable to them. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on this sum score revealed a 
significant effect of MS, F(1,81) = 4.76, p = .032, η2p = .06. In general, individuals selected fewer 
regrets when primed with death compared to dental pain (M = 6.39, SD = 3.58; M = 8.07, SD = 
3.39, respectively). To test whether the type of regrets or the amount of control had any influence 
on the results, we ran a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA, with type (omission vs. commission) 
and control (high vs. medium) as repeated measures factors. In addition to the significant main 
effect of the prime, there was a significant main effect of control, indicating that participants 
selected more regrets over which they had high compared to medium control, F(1,81) = 35.58, p 
< .001, η2p = .30 (M = 4.29, SD = 2.08; M = 3.01, SD = 1.96, respectively).  Moreover, they 
selected significantly more omissions than commissions; F(1,81) = 8.09, p < .006, η2p = .09 (M = 
3.95, SD = 2.27; M = 3.35, SD = 1.79, respectively), thereby replicating the results of Gilovich 
and Medvec (1994). There was also a significant interaction of type x control, F(1,81) = 5.29, p = 
.024, η2p = .06. However, neither type nor control interacted with the MS priming (both p > .10), 
indicating that MS decreases regret independent of the type of regret.  
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Discussion 
The results of Study 1 support our assumption that MS decreases regrets. In particular, 
participants selected fewer regrets from a predefined list when being primed with death compared 
to a control topic. 
Against the background of TMT, we expected this pattern of results because participants 
should be motivated to maintain their self-esteem. Since participants were confronted with the list 
of regrets after a delay, it can be assumed that they engaged in pro-active, distal defenses such as 
psychological repair work. For instance, participants in the MS condition might have trivialized 
some issues that applied to them or interpreted them in a positive way  (e.g., “I may have eaten 
too much junk food, but I love burgers and after all, you only live once”) as well as identify silver 
linings (e.g., “maybe I could have had better grades if I worked harder, but if I did, I would have 
spent less time with my friends,” or the other way around). 
However, there may be a possible alternative explanation that could account for the 
observed pattern of results. While dental pain is a concrete incident that many people have 
experienced, thinking about one’s death and the possible consequences requires imagining an 
incident that has not yet happened and that may occur in the far future. Previous research on 
Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2010) has shown that thinking about a distant 
future facilitates abstract thinking (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004). It is therefore possible 
that participants in the MS condition adopted a broader, more abstract frame of mind, which may 
have led them to construe the given regrets on a higher level. For instance, when considering 
items on the list, such as “I argued with my parents,” a person who wrote about death might focus 
on the big picture and decide that, in general, he or she has a good relationship with his or her 
parents and therefore there is nothing to regret. On the contrary, the same person, when being 
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primed with dental pain, might consider a concrete incident, such as a particular big fight, and 
decide that he or she did indeed regret this. Such differences in construal might have resulted in 
MS participants selecting fewer regrets from the list than the control group. We address this 
alternative explanation in Study 2.  
Study 2 
Study 2 replicates and extends the results of Study 1, namely that individuals report fewer 
regrets after a death prime. The procedure was similar to Study 1, except that individuals 
generated and wrote down their own personal regrets instead of choosing from a predefined list. 
To test for a possible effect of construal level, we also varied whether participants had to think 
about regrets concerning their last weeks or their lifetime. Since we hypothesized that the 
decrease in regrets derives from the need to maintain and protect one’s self-esteem and not from 
the adopted mindset and is thus a motivational rather than a cognitive effect, we expected to find 
the effect of MS regardless of the considered time period. 
Method 
Participants and design. Data was collected using the social psychology online pool of a 
European university. Participants were told that they had the chance to take part in a lottery for 
one of five book coupons worth 10 € each (about 13 US dollars at the time). A sample of 116 
individuals participated in the study. Three participants were excluded from the analyses because 
they either had not followed the instructions or had indicated that their data should not be 
analyzed, for instance, because they had not participated seriously (response to one yes/no item at 
the end of the study). Of the remaining participants, 72% were female and the average age was 
25.6 years (SD = 8.5, Range = 18 - 70). 75% of the participants were students. Participants were 
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randomly assigned to a 2 (prime: mortality salience vs. dental pain) x 2 (time period: last weeks 
vs. lifetime) between-subject factorial design.  
Materials and Procedure. The priming procedure was identical to the procedure 
described in Study 1. To assess regret, participants were then asked to look back on their lives / 
the last weeks and name the things they regretted most. Participants were presented with five 
empty slots to fill in their regrets and were told to name at least one regret. Six participants, 
however, explicitly replied that they regretted nothing and therefore, their number of regrets was 
coded as zero. Consequently, the total count of regrets varied between zero and five. An example 
for a lifetime regret read “I regret that I did not spend more time with my grandma,” and an 
example for a regret with regard to last week read “I regret that I did not attend the birthday 
party of a good friend because I was tired.” To control for the type of regrets the participants 
named, participants were subsequently asked to decide whether the regrets they had just named 
were acts of omission or acts of commission. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
forwarded to a separate site where they could leave their e-mail address for the lottery. 
Results 
To test the hypothesis that participants in the MS condition would name fewer regrets, all 
regrets that a person reported were totaled. A 2 (mortality salience vs. dental pain) x 2 (regrets 
with regard to the last weeks vs. lifetime regrets) ANOVA on the total number of reported regrets 
revealed a significant main effect of MS, F(1,109) = 6.70, p = .009, η2 = .06. MS participants 
reported significantly fewer regrets than participants who had thought about dental pain (M = 
1.65, SD = 0.93; M = 2.20, SD = 1.29, respectively). There was neither a significant effect of the 
time span nor a significant interaction; both ps > .215.  
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To test whether the effect of MS would differ depending on the type of regrets 
participants reported, we ran a 2 (Prime: mortality salience vs. dental pain) x 2 (Regret: omission 
vs. commission) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. Again, we found a 
significant main effect of MS, F(1,111) = 6.61, p = .011, η2 = .06. Moreover, we found a 
significant main effect of the type of regrets, F(1,111) = 5.26, p = .024, η2 = .05. Participants 
reported regretting more omissions than commissions (M = 1.14, SD = 1.07; M = 0.80, SD = 
0.90, respectively.) However, there was no significant interaction, F < 1, indicating that MS did 
not differentially influence the number of reported omissions and commissions.  
Discussion  
Study 2 corroborates and extends the results of Study 1. Again, we observed the 
hypothesized effect that participants primed with death reported fewer regrets than participants 
from a control group. Because participants generated personal regrets and did not choose from a 
predefined list, the matching results from Study 2 suggest that the pattern of results observed in 
Study 1 was not due to a peculiar selection of regrets that were specifically rejected by 
individuals in the MS condition. Moreover, the relevant time period did not affect the number of 
reported regrets: participants in the MS condition reported fewer regrets regardless of whether 
they wrote about lifetime regrets or about things they regretted during the last weeks. This 
suggests that the lower number of reported regrets in the MS condition is unlikely to be 
singularly due to a wider cognitive scope and a focus on major life events. Indeed, if the effect 
had been driven by cognitive construal, one would have expected different results in the long 
versus the short timeframe. 
We argue that participants report fewer regrets due to the need to protect their self-esteem, 
that is, due to a motivational process. The results of Study 2 are in favor of this explanation, as 
MORTALITY SALIENCE AND REGRET       - 17 - 
the effect was not moderated by levels of temporal construal, which entails a cognitive process. 
However, another possible cognitive explanation unrelated to construal level could be that the 
observed pattern of results was the result of a comparison process. After all, compared to the 
horrible notion of death, minor regrets such as being too lazy to exercise more often might appear 
relatively trivial and negligible. Note that both the motivational (via self-esteem) as well as the 
alternative cognitive comparison explanation could be driven via trivialization of potentially 
regrettable issues. However, in the case of the motivational explanation, individuals trivialize due 
to the need to protect their self-esteem. Accordingly, they should selectively try to protect 
themselves against negative, regrettable memories. On the other hand, if the cognitive 
comparison explanation applies, we would expect individuals to recall fewer memories in general 
after a death prime. After all, in the face of death, positive issues such as having lost weight 
might appear just as trivial as negative events such as missing a friend’s party. Study 3 allows 
testing these competing assumptions against each other.   
Study 3 
The goal of Study 3 was to replicate the effect of an MS prime decreasing regrets, which 
was demonstrated in Studies 1 and 2. Moreover, we tested whether a death prime would lead to 
participants reporting fewer incidents in general, which should be the case if everything just 
seems trivial in comparison to the horrible notion of death, or whether the effect would be 
specific for regrets, which should be the case if participants actively engage in psychological 
repair work to bolster their self-esteem. In this case, MS should not keep participants from 
reporting other events that do not pose a threat to self-esteem, such as things that they did or did 
not do, which they are glad about (henceforth referred to as “rejoices”). 
Method 
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Participants and design. Fifty-nine psychology students participated in the study for 
course credit. Two participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not consent to 
the use of their data. Of the remaining 57 participants, 83 % were female and the average age was 
21.42 years (SD = 5.67, Range: 18 - 55). They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Death vs. Dental 
Pain) x 2 (Regrets vs. Rejoices) mixed factorial design with the second factor as repeated 
measure. 
Materials and procedure. The study was assessed via computer in the laboratory. The 
MS priming was the same as in Studies 1 and 2. To assess the amount of regrets and rejoices, 
participants were asked to name both things they regretted and things they were glad about 
(rejoices), without any instruction with regard to which kind of memories to begin with or how 
many of each to recall. The number of reported memories was limited to a total of fifteen 
memories (regrets and rejoices). An example for a reported regret read “I regret that I did not 
focus more on my work during my time in school,” and an example for a reported rejoice read “I 
am glad that I took a gap year before starting university and went travelling for six months.” 
After finishing this task, participants were presented with their answers again and asked to decide 
for each whether it represented a rejoice or a regret, and whether it represented a commission or 
an omission.  
Results  
Regrets and rejoices were totaled separately for each participant. To test the hypothesis 
that participants would only report fewer regrets but not fewer rejoices in the MS compared to the 
dental pain condition, we used the mixed model procedure in SPSS to model and test the 
expected ordinal interaction as a specific contrast hypothesis, following the recommended 
procedure of Bobko (1986) for testing hypothesized ordinal interactions (see also Rosenthal & 
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Rosnow, 1985). More specifically, the MS/Regret condition was tested against the other three 
conditions (contrast weights: -3 1 1 1). 
In general, participants named more rejoices than regrets, F(1,55)  = 9.11, p = .004, 
η2 = .14. There was no significant main effect of MS, F(1,55)  = 2.38, p = .13. However, the 
specified ordinal interaction was significant, t(89.04) = 3.48, p = .001. Analyzing the simple main 
effects revealed that individuals reported significantly fewer regrets after a MS compared to a 
dental pain prime, F(1,55)  = 5.00, p = .029, η2 = .08 (M = 2.18, SD = 1.31; M = 2.97, SD = 1.35, 
respectively). There was no significant difference in the number of rejoices participants named 
after an MS compared to a dental pain prime, F < 1 (M = 3.04 SD = 1.86; M = 3.41, SD = 1.90, 
respectively). Moreover, participants who were primed with MS reported significantly fewer 
regrets than rejoices; F(1,55)   = 7.72, p = .007, η2 = .12 (M = 2.18 SD = 1.31;  M = 3.04, 
SD = 1.86, respectively). Participants who were primed with dental pain did not significantly 
differ in the amount of regrets and rejoices they named, F(1,55)   = 2.19, p = .14 (M = 2.97 
SD = 1.35; M = 3.41, SD = 1.96, respectively).  
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 and further demonstrated that a death 
prime significantly reduces the number of reported regrets, but not the number of reported 
rejoices. This pattern supports the hypothesis that a death prime decreases the amount of regrets 
individuals report because of a motivational process, namely the need to maintain one’s self-
esteem after a death prime. Similarly, our findings are not easily explained by a purely 
cognitively driven process. If the decrease in regrets would occur solely due to MS participants 
trivializing everyday issues due to a different comparison standard, we would have expected this 
trivialization effect to emerge for rejoices as well. However, while our data suggests that a 
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cognitively driven process cannot account for all of the current results, we believe that it might 
indeed complement the motivational process that we assume. 
The results from Study 3 also render other alternative explanations unlikely. For instance, 
one might have assumed a general cognitive impairment after MS, as it has been shown for some 
self-regulation tasks (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). Moreover, one might have 
assumed that MS participants would try to report fewer self-related memories in order to avoid 
self-awareness (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998). However, both 
alternative explanations would have predicted a decrease for both rejoices and regrets. Therefore, 
we think our results are best explained by a motivational explanation stating that MS specifically 
reduces regret due to individuals’ need to maintain their self-esteem.  
At first glance, it may seem surprising that the MS prime only decreased regrets but did 
not increase rejoices if MS heightens the need to maintain self-esteem. However, our results 
match those from a recent set of studies by Ma-Kellams and Blascovic (2012), who did not find 
an effect of MS on different measures of enjoyment of daily activities for Western compared to 
Eastern participants. They explained this difference with regard to culturally differing coping 
styles. According to the authors, Western participants engage relatively more in defensive coping 
styles such as bolstering their worldviews and trying to maintain their self-esteem, but do not 
tend to engage in distraction-based coping styles such as increased enjoyment of life. Similarly, 
studies on nostalgia, that is, reminiscing about positive past events, have also demonstrated that 
following a death prime, individuals become temporarily more nostalgic only when they have a 
high disposition for nostalgia anyway. For those who do not, state nostalgia was even marginally 
lowered after a death prime (Juhl, Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2010).   
General Discussion 
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Death is something that all individuals must face at some point. Moreover, people are 
constantly reminded of the fact that they are, eventually and inevitably, going to die, for instance, 
when watching the news or crime shows or when passing by a cemetery. How does this make us 
feel about our lives? Does it remind us of all the things we were going to do but haven’t yet? Or 
does it make us feel guilty about all the mistakes we have made that we cannot undo anymore?  
Even though death and regret are two concepts that one may expect to be closely linked, 
the present studies are the first to combine these two fields of research. Common sense might 
suggest that regrets will seem more profound with the thought of one’s own death in mind. 
However, building on TMT as well as previous research about regret regulation, we hypothesized 
instead that a death prime should even reduce the amount of regrets reported by an individual. 
This is because the motivation to protect one’s self-esteem while mortality is salient is likely to 
conflict with experiencing regret—an emotion that is highly threatening to one’s self-esteem. As 
a consequence, we assumed that individuals would regulate potentially regrettable issues by 
engaging in psychological repair work (trivialization, identifying a silver lining, positive 
interpretation), which would result in fewer reported regrets. We demonstrated the hypothesized 
decrease in regrets after a death prime in three studies, of which two assessed regrets in an open-
ended format (Studies 2 and 3) and one had participants select regrets from a predefined list 
(Study 1). Moreover, we tested for several alternative explanations. For instance, one might have 
assumed that following a death prime, individuals would report fewer regrets of a particular type 
or that writing about something as abstract as death would result in regrets being construed on a 
higher level which could result in fewer reported regrets as well.  However, in our studies the 
type of regret (Study 1), the amount of perceived control (Study 1), or the considered timeframe 
(Study 2) did not moderate the effect of MS on the reported or selected number of regrets. That 
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type, time period, and assessment procedure did not moderate our results can be taken as an 
indication that the hypothesized effect is robust and generalizes across various contexts. In Study 
3, we additionally tested whether thinking about one’s death reduces all types of memories, but 
observed that MS reduces regrets only.  Together, these findings support the notion that the 
reduction of reported regrets is a motivational (i.e., to maintain a positive self-esteem) rather than 
a purely cognitive effect. 
Our research adds to the literature in several ways: By investigating the interrelationship 
between death and regret, first we extend the literature of research on Terror Management 
Theory, and second on regret regulation. Third, our results give rise to speculations about 
possible benefits of (not) experiencing regret. Fourth, because of the many decisions that 
individuals regret in their lives as well as the potential threat that both the experience of regret 
and thinking about death pose to an individual’s self-esteem, our findings are highly relevant with 
regard to research focusing on life-span development. We elaborate on all four aspects in the 
following. 
Terror Management and Regret 
Prior research on Terror Management Theory has mainly focused on the aspect of cultural 
worldview defense as an anxiety buffering mechanism response to MS (for a review, see Burke, 
et al., 2010). However, while one’s worldview typically depends on socially shared standards or 
norms, the second aspect of the anxiety buffer, self-esteem, may also be influenced by more 
personal or private standards. The present results significantly contribute to the growing literature 
suggesting that death primes may also affect very personal emotions associated with self-esteem, 
such as regrets. To our knowledge, our results are the first to investigate how individuals deal 
with potentially negative events of their past in order to maintain self-esteem in the present and 
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defend themselves against existential anxiety. By trivializing potentially regrettable issues or 
interpreting ambiguous events in a positive way, individuals create and derive meaning from 
issues that might otherwise appear to be regrettable mistakes. This tendency to derive a positive 
meaning from seemingly negative events to fight existential threat might be reflected in many 
sayings such as the adage that fate (or God) sometimes works in mysterious ways. After all, it is 
not just the positive but also the negative experiences that ultimately shape an individual and 
contribute to a meaningful existence.  
Coping with Regret 
We have suggested that, in order to maintain their self-esteem, individuals regulate their 
regrets by engaging in psychological repair work (trivialization, identifying silver linings, 
positive interpretation). However, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) have suggested other 
possibilities of how individuals might cope with regret aside from psychological repair work, 
such as the complete denial and suppression of certain regrets. While such a coping process 
might occur in some cases, we believe it unlikely that it is the main process driving the effect in 
the current studies for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. First, from a terror management 
perspective, suppression and blocking of harmful information is typical for proximal defenses 
which occur immediately after a death prime (Pyszczynski, et al., 1999). However, since we used 
a delay in all studies, it is more likely that our participants engaged in pro-active, distal defenses 
such as psychological repair work.  Second, if participants were suppressing or denying regrets, 
they should have been significantly faster in writing down the remaining regrets compared to the 
control group. But despite reporting fewer regrets, MS participants took about the same time for 
the task in Study 2 as the control group (MMS = 95.28 s, SD = 64.56, MDP = 101.68 s, SD = 
66.09, F < 1). Third, MS also decreased regrets in Study 1, where suppression of regrets was 
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unlikely since participants selected their regrets from a predefined list, which was the same for all 
participants. While individuals might engage in suppression when asked to recall information, it 
appears unlikely that they would fail to remember that a specific issue potentially applies to them 
when being presented with it.  
Benefits of (not) Experiencing Regret 
Our results give reason to speculate about possible functions of (not) experiencing regret. 
According to a situated social cognition perspective, all cognitions as well as motivational and 
affective states serve the ultimate goal of preparing an individual for action, meaning a quick and 
adaptive reaction (Smith & Semin, 2004). Correspondingly, the experience of regret can caution 
an individual about repeating a certain mistake and serve as a source of motivation for correcting 
that mistake if possible or searching for alternative courses of action (Camille et al., 2004; 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Following that line of 
thought, experiencing fewer regrets and re-interpreting or euphemizing potentially regrettable 
issues, as individuals did under MS, would be disadvantageous. This is because individuals might 
miss out on important chances for self-improvement and learning from their mistakes. In line 
with this argumentation, Crocker and Park (2004) have argued that the pursuit of self-esteem can 
interfere with learning and mastery, because negative feedback and mistakes are interpreted as 
self-threats instead of chances for improvement. On the other hand, bothering too much with 
specific regrets and ruminating about single events in one’s past and what one should have done 
better can also be impedimental in moving forward and result in biased reasoning and 
counterproductive behavior (Sherman & McConnell, 1996).  In the worst case, individuals can 
get into vicious circles out of negative affect and counterfactual thoughts which are characteristic 
for depression (Roese, 1997). In this sense, MS could even have positive consequences by 
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helping the individual not to worry too much about past events. Accordingly, it has been shown 
that under certain conditions, MS can enhance creativity, innovation, the exploration of novel 
alternatives as well as flexible cognitive structures (for an overview, see Vail et al., 2012).  
Regret in the Face of Actual Death 
Our research offers an interesting new perspective on how individuals react when they 
receive a reminder that one day in the distant future they are going to die. On average, our 
participants were young, healthy persons in the prime of their lives. But how does MS affect an 
individual who is confronted with the actual end of his or her life, for instance, people who suffer 
from a terminal illness and therefore are subjected to a “permanent death prime?” How do these 
people cope with their regrets and do they report fewer regrets than healthy individuals?  
We would assume that the experience of regret might even decrease to a stronger degree 
when an individual is close to the end of his or her life. Although regret has positive functions, 
too (such as serving as a motivator which prevents individuals from repeating their mistakes, see 
above), these positive functions may be unimportant in the face of death, when action is not 
possible anymore. Hence, for an individual who is about to die, experiencing a motivational state 
that fosters future action may be pointless and only bring additional discomfort to the dying 
(Neimeyer, Currier, Coleman, Tomer, & Samuel, 2011). Accordingly, Wrosch and Heckhausen 
(2002) showed that older people experienced a lower intensity of regretful feelings especially if 
they reported having little control over the things they regretted. Similarly, at the end of their life 
people might be increasingly motivated to make this end appear as positive as possible and to 
believe that they have lived an overall meaningful life. Against this background, we speculate 
that at the end of their lives, people regret less than before.  
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Taken together, there is theoretical as well as empirical evidence that when the end of 
one’s life nears, people are motivated to believe that the things they could potentially regret are 
“too few to mention,” as Frank Sinatra put it in his song “My Way.” Knowing how dying 
individuals deal with regret could be of great importance for practitioners working in palliative 
care and treating patients with incurable illnesses, such as medical practitioners, nurses or 
therapists. 
Conclusion 
In sum, three studies consistently demonstrate that thinking about death decreases the 
amount of regrets that individuals report. This effect is most likely due to individuals trying to 
protect their threatened self-esteem and, therefore, trying to trivialize and re-interpret potentially 
regrettable issues. In line with Terror Management Theory, it therefore seems that life is indeed 
“too short for regrets”–at least when we realize how short it really is. 
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Appendix 
Predefined regrets from Study 1 by type of regret  
 
Omission / High control  
I regret that I didn’t work harder to get better grades.     
I regret that I didn’t spend enough time with my family.     
I regret that I didn’t invest more time and effort in my friendships.    
I regret not having pursued more hobbies.  
Commission / High control  
I regret the educational/career choices I made.     
I regret that I argued with my parents.      
I regret that I ate junk food on a routine basis.     
I regret that I wasted my leisure time on useless activities.    
Omission / Medium Control 
I regret that my teachers and I did not choose the best academic options for me.  
I regret that my family and I never tried to become more attached to each other.  
I regret that my family and I did not take any actions for me to become more independent.  
I regret that my family and I didn't do many leisure activities together.   
Commission / Medium control 
I regret that my family and I complied with certain traditions we were not convinced of.   
I regret that my family and I often quarreled about daily life issues.   
I regret that my partner and I broke up.       
I regret that my family and I became negative because of the bad luck that happened to us. 
 
 
